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Abstract 
 The United States maintains one of the largest and most diverse general aviation (GA) industries. However, 
GA results in hundreds of fatalities each year; thus, increasing safety and preventing accidents are the core values of 
the GA industry. This research lays the foundation for more work to be completed in order for GA to remain safe, 
efficient and have their needs met. The findings explain the current trends of GA accidents compared to commercial 
aviation, the differences in operational strategies between the two types, efforts that have been made by the Federal 
Aviation Administration (and others) to improve GA, and finally, recommended alternatives for improving GA 
safety using commercial aviation operational strategies. As a result of this study, recommendations to the 
stakeholders in the GA community include: (1) embracing in-cockpit technology to not only enable safer operations 
in crowded skies, but also permit reliable data collection on GA trends for data-driven decision making; (2) offering 
valuable incentives for pilots to undergo quality recurrent and safety training, while also eliminating loopholes or 
incentives that compromise safety; and (3) instituting a system of checks and balances to ensure pilots have a 
sufficient safety net from human error. 
Introduction 
With over 200,000 general aviation (GA) (14 CFR Part 911) aircraft in its airspace, the United States hosts 
the largest and most diverse general aviation community in the world (Duquette & Dorr, 2012; GAMA, 2010). 
However, unlike its commercial airline (14 CFR Part 121) counterparts, GA operations has a comparatively high 
accident rate that has remained steady over the years. To address this, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), 
the aviation regulatory body for the U.S., has implemented a new GA safety improvement program to reduce GA 
accidents by 10 percent over the 2008-2018 period by using a “non-regulatory, proactive, and data-driven strategy to 
get results” (Spence, 2011; Duquette & Dorr, 2012, p.1). GA accident rates have always been higher than those of 
the airlines and it has always been a popular perception that (airline) “flying” is the safest mode of transportation, a 
recognition not shared with GA (Sevillian, 2012; Shetty & Hansman, 2012). One possible reason for this disparity is 
the difference in operational style between the two types. If airline operations have such excellent safety records, it 
may be possible to improve GA safety by adopting one or many airline best practices and procedures. The objective 
of this study is to understand the importance of improving safety protocols in general aviation by determining how 
general aviation can use similar operational strategies as those of commercial air carriers.  
                                                          
1 14 CFR Part 91-General Operating and Flight Rules 
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Literature Review 
General aviation in the United States represents a large majority of the worldwide GA community. Out of 
320,000 GA aircraft worldwide, nearly 228,000 of those are registered in the United States (GAMA, 2010). In terms 
of flight operations in the NAS, only one-third of the operations were commercial operations, while the remaining 
two-thirds were GA, consisting of private airplanes, business jets, air taxi, etc. (Duquette & Dorr, 2012).  
General Aviation accidents result in hundreds of fatalities each year (GAO, 2012). According to the 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), there has been a slight increase in overall and fatal civil aviation 
accidents in the U.S. from 2010 to 2011. This figure includes both commercial and GA activity, but scheduled Part 
121 air carriers had no contribution to the fatality rate, leaving the majority of all fatal accidents in the GA category 
(NTSB, 2012a).  
Generally speaking, GA has always had a higher accident rate than commercial aviation due to differences 
in training, experience, technology, and procedures. GA is composed of a wide range of operation: crop-dusting, 
banner towing, personal flying, corporate flying, etc. (Air Safety Institute, 2010; GAMA, 2010). As a result of this 
diversity, some types of GA operations are safer than others (GAO, 2001). Similarly, the required type of pilot 
certificate and training varies with each GA operation type. Furthermore, GA pilots have limited cockpit resources 
and flight support compared to their airline counterparts (Air Safety Institute, 2010). Airlines are required to have 
co-pilots, dispatchers, mechanics, loadmasters, and others that help the pilot before, during, and after each flight to 
enhance safety and maintain a system of checks and balances. In GA operations, a single pilot may conduct all 
aspects of flight (Air Safety Institute, 2010).  
Most GA airports lack the advanced services the airlines are provided at larger airports, such as longer 
runways, precision approaches, and approach lighting systems (Air Safety Institute, 2010). According to the NTSB, 
takeoffs and landings are considered the most critical phases of flight and are more prone to result in an accident 
(NTSB, 2011). Operating out of thousands of airports, GA has more takeoffs and landings on a per hour basis than 
air carriers (Air Safety Institute, 2010). Additionally, airliners have the capability to fly over or around most weather 
phenomena because they have the most advanced systems and technologies to help the pilot cope with hazardous 
situations, where most GA aircraft do not have this capability (Air Safety Institute, 2010). 
There are many possible reasons for this higher accident rate, but this review of literature will focus on one 
aspect: operational support. Pilots often need to make decisions and execute appropriate actions under uncertainty 
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and time pressure. A means used by air carriers to assist pilots in these tasks is through the use of a decision support 
system (DSS)2. The importance of DSS is that the aircraft can safely continue operation while the DSS outlines 
alternative actions, or suggests an optimal solution (Schroeder & Sarter, 2001).   
Another support resource is a dispatcher. The first dispatcher dates back to the 1920’s when the Post Office 
Department established the first airmail radio stations (Krause & Jansen, n.d.). These radio stations were staffed 
with personnel who provided an early flight following service: departure time, a coded flight plan, and weather 
observations to the pilots. Today, both airline pilots and dispatchers are held jointly responsible for the safety of 
every flight by FAR 121.533 (Avjobs, n.d.; Krause & Jansen, n.d.). As a result, every decision in a commercial 
flight must have joint approval of both the pilot-in-command and the corresponding dispatcher.  
Over the years, the aviation industry has reduced accidents through the use of research and analysis of 
systems. The aviation industry continues to advance in the development of new protocols, methods and technology. 
This study clearly recognizes the need for more work to be done in order to remain safe and efficient and meet the 
needs of GA.  
Methodology 
The objective of this study was to understand the importance of furthering safety protocols in general 
aviation by determining how it can use similar operational strategies as that of commercial airline operations3. This 
study addressed four research questions:  
1. What are the current trends in general aviation accidents compared to commercial aviation? 
2. What actions have been taken to improve general aviation safety? 
3. What are the differences in operational support between general aviation and commercial aviation? 
4. What methods can be used to provide and integrate support services, similar to Part 121, for the general 
aviation community to enhance user convenience and flying safety? 
Identification of current safety trends between general aviation and commercial aviation was performed by 
analyzing the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) Aviation Accident Database (relevant sections 
available in Appendix A and Appendix B). Identification of actions that have been taken to improve general aviation 
safety was performed through review of documents and reports from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), 
                                                          
2	Decision	support	systems	(DSS)	are	defined	as	“computer‐based	systems	designed	to	help	decision‐makers	use	date,	knowledge	and	
communications	technology	to	identify	problems	and	make	decisions	that	solve	those	problems.”	(I‐95	Corridor	Coalition,	2012,	p.1) 
3 Note that only Part 121 operations are considered as commercial airline operations in this paper	
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NTSB, the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), and other groups. The differences in 
operational support between general aviation and commercial air carriers are identified through a review of 
documents and reports from GAO, Air Safety Institute, scholarly articles, and the Federal Aviation Regulations 
(FARs).  Potential ways to implement and integrate Part 121-like support services to the general aviation community 
are identified through review of documents and reports from the FAA, GAO, and other groups from the private and 
public sectors. The conclusions and recommendations made in this work are derived from publically available 
sources.  
Results and Discussion 
The following sections present the results of the study paired with their respective research questions. 
Question 1: What are the current trends in general aviation accidents compared to commercial aviation? 
There is a public perception that general aviation (GA) is less safe than commercial operations and should 
be verified with accident statistics. Interpreting accident data collected over a ten-year period (2000-2010) from the 
NTSB’s aviation accident database provides a comparison of accidents, fatalities, and rates between GA and 
commercial operations. The starting point for this data analysis was comparing the number of accidents for GA and 
commercial operations. However, because GA generally logs more flight hours than commercial, a direct 
comparison of the number of accidents between the two is inaccurate. A comparison of accidents by the 
corresponding number of flight hours normalizes the statistics4. Figure 1 provides a comparison of the total 
accidents per 100,000 flight hours flown between GA and airline operations. In Figure 1, there are more GA 
accidents per 100,000 flight hours than that of commercial. Over a ten-year period, there was an average of 6.76 
accidents per 100,000 GA flight hours compared to 0.18 accidents per 100,000 commercial operations.  
 
Figure 1- Total Accidents per Flight Hours (Rate) 
                                                          
4 Normalizing the accident rate by 100,000 flight hours was the only comparable metric between GA and commercial operations. This is because 
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Figure 1 includes both fatal and non-fatal accidents within the total accidents. However, it is interesting to 
see what percentages of those accidents were fatal. Figure 2 and Figure 3 show two different ways of looking at fatal 
accidents between GA and commercial. Error! Reference source not found. depicts fatal accidents only, showing 
there was still a large difference in accident rates between the two operation types. Note that four years (2002, 2007, 
2008, and 2010) saw zero fatal commercial accidents.   
 
Figure 2- Fatal Accidents per Flight Hours (Rate) 
In general, a larger percentage of GA accidents were fatal compared to that of commercial, as shown in 
Figure 3. While the percentage of fatal commercial accidents were largely erratic, it was consistently less than that 
of GA, which remained steady around 20%. On average, 19% of all GA accidents were fatal from 2000-2010, 
compared to 4.30% for commercial accidents over the same time span. It should be noted that the brief spike in fatal 
commercial accidents in 2001 is accurate, not anomalous, and not due to the September 11 terrorist attacks.  
 
Figure 3- Fatal Accidents per Total Accidents (Rate) 
From 2000 to 2010, NTSB statistics show two important trends in the accident rates of GA and commercial 
operations: GA accident rates are indeed higher than that of airline operations, and GA has consistently maintained 
an overall accident rate well above that of commercial. Currently, the NTSB investigates around 1,600 GA accidents 
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(NTSB, 2012b). While it is not practical to cover all 16,000 GA accidents within the ten-year period, a few 
representative examples, found in Appendix C, can provide some insight (NTSB, 2012b).  
The FAA forecasted an increase in the number of GA and commercial aircraft in the next 20 years, which 
means increasingly crowded skies (as alluded by NextGen) and the need for additional assurance for safety (FAA, 
2012a). The idea that commercial is safer than GA is shown by the imbalance between accident rates between the 
two operational types. This last characteristic underscores a need to improve GA safety.  
Question 2: What are the differences in operational strategies between general aviation and commercial aviation? 
One way to determine why commercial aviation is safer than GA is to identify the differences in which 
they are operated, in terms of what operational resources are available or unavailable to GA. The approach used was 
based on the FAA’s methodology using a “non-regulatory, proactive, and data-driven strategy” to identify 
operational strategies (Duquette & Dorr, 2012). 
Commercial pilots undergo more frequent training than GA pilots, and although the FAA has a set 
minimum standard for recurrent training and proficiency checks for commercial operators, most (if not all) major 
carriers go above and beyond the minimum requirements (ALPA, 2011). Airlines have a mix of computer-based, 
simulator, procedural, and other types of training to keep their crews highly proficient on a specific family of aircraft. 
For example, United Airlines has a current training cycle that consists of proficiency training at nine months, and a 
proficiency check at 18 months (ALPA, 2011). In contrast, GA only has a set minimum standard for proficiency 
check once every 24 months (ALPA, 2011). However, proficiency and currency are only two aspects of how 
commercial training is different from GA. The combination of recurrent training and liberal contingency planning is 
one of the ways commercial operations differ from GA, which could be used as an opportunity for improvement. 
Another differentiator between the two operational styles is that airline operations and decisions are made 
jointly between the pilot-in-command and responsible dispatcher (Air Safety Institute, 2010). As a result, all aspects 
of the flight and any changes in flight plan must be approved by both parties (Avjobs, n.d.). This system of checks 
and balances ensures proper analysis and execution of decisions to help mitigate pilot error. Similarly, a two-person 
cockpit, staffed by a pilot and co-pilot, combined with Crew Resource Management,5 complements this system of 
checks and balances by allowing the co-pilot to hold the pilot accountable for his or her decisions (American 
                                                          
5	Crew Resource Management (CRM) can be defined as, “using all available sources-information, equipment, and people- to achieve safe and 
efficient flight operations.” The purpose of CRM is to identify and mitigate threats that can lead to human error. (American Psychological 
Association, 2004) 
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Psychological Association, 2004). In contrast, a majority of GA operations are unsupervised, solo (one-pilot), and 
generally have no system of checks and balances (Air Safety Institute, 2010).   
In order for commercial operators to improve existing levels of aviation safety, they have been encouraged 
by the FAA to create and implement their own Safety Management Systems (SMS) (Dorr & Duquette, 2010). SMS 
is a method used by many airlines today to enhance safety performance and move beyond mere compliance with 
regulations (Dorr & Duquette, 2010). While SMS is still in its early implementation stages with many airlines, there 
are benefits that have and will be seen throughout the future if implemented. Examples of such benefits include: 
reduction in material loss and/costs (in general), enhancement of productivity, logical prioritization of safety needs, 
compliance with legal responsibilities for safety, etc. (Bayuk, n.d.). While adoption of a SMS in Part 121 carriers is 
encouraged by the FAA today, the agency plans require it in the future as an evolution of safety (MITRE 
Corporation, 2012). Commercial airline pilots and others in flight operations are encouraged to adopt SMS in their 
duties not only for their safety, but also as an incentive to assure job security (Bayuk, n.d.). This reasonably implies 
that SMS adoption by GA will be slow, since there is no motivation for GA pilots, unlike those for commercial 
pilots, and could be the root barrier for successful adoption of SMS in the GA community. 
 Another example of a differentiator between the two operational styles is that commercial operators are 
more able to adopt modern technologies both in and out of the cockpit, according to the Air Safety Institute (2010). 
Having the most advanced systems and modern technologies enables commercial aviation to not only utilize the 
latest advancements in safety, but also generate and collect large amounts of data for different purposes (Boeing, 
2013). The primary rationale for collecting data is to allow operators to identify trends in the system, detect any 
errors (if any), and finally correct them (GAO, 2012). Lack of information needed to fix an issue acts as a barrier in 
decision-making and consensus building with the industry/community. As Peter Drucker, a legendary management 
expert, once said, “If you can’t measure it, you can’t manage it.” (Claremont Graduate University, n.d.) However, 
large amounts of data are of little use if there is no way of analyzing it and drawing conclusions. Commercial 
operators collect various data in order to understand and achieve common goals such as improving service, safety, 
environmental performance, etc. In contrast, GA is less able to capitalize on this because GA owners and operators 
not only are less likely to adopt the technologies that enable data capture, but also less able to analyze the collected 
data (GAO, 2012). 
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From the differences previously cited, it is safe to say that commercial aviation has more resources 
available for operation, unlike with GA, where there is a lack of resources. Furthermore, although the airline 
industry has a relatively low accident record, they continuously enhance their safety systems to maintain an 
excellent safety record. This is primarily achieved through pressure of the public and enforcement from the FAA, in 
addition to maintaining a positive public image. Overall, flight plan quality and flexibility, available resources, and 
governmental regulations are the primary differences between GA and commercial operations and where 
improvements can be made. 
Question 3: What actions have been taken to improve general aviation safety? 
Federal agencies, as well as aviation stakeholders, have recognized growing concerns on GA’s high 
accident rate. Key stakeholders like the FAA, NTSB, AOPA, and others have attempted to improve and reduce GA 
accidents. This section defines the actions that have been taken to improve GA safety and the results of those actions.  
The Federal Aviation Administration 
As GA continues to maintain an unchanging accident rate, the FAA has made an effort to improve the GA 
safety issue through a five-year strategic approach based on risk management, safety promotion and communication, 
outreach and engagement, and training (GAO, 2012). Using this approach, the FAA hopes to see a possible culture 
change in GA regarding flight safety (Duquette & Dorr, 2012). Because this approach was just started in 2011, the 
results of FAA efforts are still undetermined. Articles from the Experimental Aircraft Association (EAA) indicate 
that GA’s safety record is off to a “worrying start” since the fiscal year began on October 1, 2012 (EAA, 2012)6. As 
part of this five-year approach, the FAA claimed to strengthen its connection with different aviation associations 
(GAO, 2012). However, it is difficult to measure its effectiveness and the FAA officials claimed there are no 
performance metrics in place to gauge this five-year plan (GAO, 2012). Performance measures are important 
because they monitor accomplishments toward desired goal(s). The only indicator, or strategy in place that is 
available and semi-reliable, would be to see the changes in trends of the GA fatal accident rates (GAO, 2012).  
The General Accounting Office (GAO) performed a thorough analysis in 2001 of GA trends in accidents 
and how the FAA and industry groups responded to those trends (GAO, 2001). The results of the GAO analysis 
were similar to what is seen today in GA. For example, the GAO 2001 report indicated that GA accident rates were 
                                                          
6 In October and September of 2012, there were a total of 55 fatal GA accidents (compared to 44 during the same time in 2011), and in the 
beginning of December alone there were nine more (EAA, 2012). The total number of fatalities is still to be determined until the NTSB has 
written the reports (EAA, 2012). 
REDUCING GENERAL AVIATION ACCIDENTS    10
about 20 times higher than that of commercial aviation (GAO, 2001). The results of pilot-error (relating to procedure, 
skill, and judgment mistakes) were the number one cause of GA accidents for both GAO reports (GAO, 2001; GAO, 
2012). In response to this finding, the FAA provided additional education and training programs through the Internet, 
hosted seminars, began the “Safer Skies” program (a major initiative to reduce the number of fatal accidents), and 
reinforced safety oversight by enhancing certification and training procedures for flight instructors (GAO, 2001). 
Furthermore, the FAA performed an evaluation of GA pilot attendance at the safety seminars, which resulted in a 
lack of GA pilot attendance (GAO, 2001). Overall, there was a lack of available data and there were no performance 
measures to indicate progress of FAA efforts (GAO, 2001).  
In 2008, the FAA unveiled a 10-year plan to reduce GA accidents by about 10 percent by 2018 (from a 
baseline of 1.12 accidents per 100,000 flight hours to 1.00 accident per 100,000 flight hours) (GAO, 2012). This is 
different from the 5-year plan mentioned previously in that the 10-year sets an end goal to improve GA safety while 
the 5-year plan sets a general strategy to improve GA safety. As of 2011, the results indicate that the FAA is not 
meeting its goal according to a 2012 Government Accountability Office report. With three years into the program, 
the accident rate was 1.17, an increase from the 2008 1.12 baseline. Interestingly, the FAA renewed is contract with 
the General Aviation Joint Safety Committee7 (GAJSC) (GAO, 2012). This decision was made despite the 
concerning results of the 2001 GAO report, which revealed issues with GAJSC regarding lack of data and member 
participation (GAO, 2001). Furthermore, according to an FAA official, GAJSC has floundered in the past and its 
prior efforts were topic driven and based on expert opinion rather than data analysis (GAO, 2012).  
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 
In the aviation industry, the NTSB is concerned with GA safety and stated that it is on its “Most Wanted 
List” (NTSB, 2012c) As a result, the NTSB has recognized the trend of accidents and identified several 
recommendations for the FAA, which provide better training for pilots and aircraft mechanics, and define new ways 
of screening risky behavior (NTSB, 2012c). The NTSB notes that summer is the peak season for GA activity and 
therefore a great opportunity to renew the efforts of reducing GA accidents (Hersman, 2012). Although the NTSB 
does not have regulatory power, they have held safety forums that discussed raising awareness of the high GA 
accident rate, recurring safety issues in certain areas, promoting and facilitating the safety issues, and determining 
how to address the issues to improve GA. However, enlisting participation from the GA community is a challenge 
                                                          
7 General Aviation Joint Safety Committee (GAJSC), a “government-industry partnership that focuses on analyzing general aviation accident data 
to develop effective intervention strategies.” (GAO, 2012, p.24) 
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(GAO, 2012). Many GA pilots fail to take advantage of the free resources made available to them, such as education 
and training to further their knowledge in air safety (a critical component to improving GA safety). The FAA is 
collaborating with the NTSB to better implement actions to improve GA safety (GAO, 2012).  
Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) 
One of the most promising programs that could improve aviation safety is FAA’s concept of operations for 
the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) (FAA, 2011a). NextGen is the transition of the current 
ground-based navigation system to a satellite-based one, using a combination of technologies (GAO, 2012). One 
such technology will notify pilots of the precise locations of other airplanes around them, increasing situational 
awareness and enhancing safety (McHale, 2010). The FAA has also been working closely with manufacturers in 
defining what equipment GA operators will need to have in order to support NextGen (GAO, 2012). As a result, this 
collaboration will not only accelerate the adoption of NextGen in GA, but also improve overall GA safety by 
streamlining the integration and certification process. While this is primarily an FAA initiative, it is a combined 
effort of many governmental agencies and private industry, and deserves special mention here.  
Aerospace Industry 
Other industry associations, such as Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA), Experimental 
Aircraft Association (EAA), the National Business Aviation Association (NBAA), and General Aviation 
Manufacturers Association (GAMA), have been actively involved in finding ways to address the GA safety problem. 
AOPA formed the Air Safety Foundation, which holds one of the largest accident databases, hosts seminars, 
provides free online courses, and conducts in-depth accident analysis and research on several GA topics (AOPA 
Foundation, n.d.d). AOPA’s view on GA safety is mostly aligned with the FAA’s (an industry-wide effort), but the 
organization’s efforts have noticed a lack of GA pilots in the voluntary training and education sessions previously 
mentioned (AOPA, 2012). The Foundation’s Director of Education, Paul Deres, stated that not even its own 
members take advantage of the free safety programs, which almost all are available online (AOPA, 2012). He also 
recognized that the fatal accident rates remain nearly unchanged, as well as the primary cause of those accidents 
(AOPA, 2012). The Association states that the safety culture of GA cannot be changed simply through online 
material and dissemination of information (AOPA, 2012). AOPA’s current efforts include hiring seven new fulltime 
positions within the organization that will collaborate at the state and local levels to not only assure GA safety, but 
also continue reaching out to GA pilots (AOPA, 2012; Brown, 2012).  
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EAA is currently working with the FAA to figure out new methods to collect and analyze data to reflect the 
actual experiences of accidents within the different areas of GA (EAA, n.d.). GAMA also works closely with the 
federal agencies to assure they have the necessary resources to conduct a timely yet thorough accident or incident 
investigation (GAMA, 2010). Overall, the industry associations are actively involved in a risk-based approach: 
promoting safety by disseminating safety information and ways to improve oneself as a pilot through additional 
training. Industry associations are trying their best to reach out to the community in order to safeguard the future for 
GA, and before the fear of more restrictive measures occurs (AOPA Foundation, n.d.b).  
These findings acknowledge that the FAA, as well as other key stakeholders, have recognized the growing 
concern on GA’s high accident rate. All have embarked on several initiatives to meet the goal of reducing the 
accident rate within the industry, which revolved mainly around three areas: technology, training and education, and 
safety promotion, which fits the FAA’s “non-regulatory, proactive, and data-driven strategy.” (Duquette & Dorr, 
2012) However, with the efforts made, overall changes in the accident rate have not been seen. Although federal 
agencies and industry associations have put in significant effort, convincing those that are not participating in free 
opportunities, such as refresher courses, remains a challenge. 
Question 4: What methods can be used to provide and integrate operational strategies, similar to Part 121, for the 
general aviation community to enhance user convenience and flying safety? 
Historical data shows that commercial aviation is far safer than general aviation. These two operational 
types differ in many ways and those differences could be the reason why one is safer than the other. The vast 
number of operational differences between commercial and GA has been offered previously as opportunities to 
improve the safety of the latter. In this section, a clear set of recommendations to improve GA safety is derived from 
what was learned in the previous sections. It is important to highlight that modeling what commercial aviation has 
done to improve its safety in GA is not a new idea. GAJSC was formed in the late 1990s as a result of the successes 
of the joint government-industry Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST), which reduced the commercial fatal 
accident rate by 83 percent from 1998 to 2008 (GAO, 2012).  
As a result from this study, stakeholders in the GA community agree that safety improvements should 
revolve around three areas: technology, training and education, and safety promotion. Therefore, the Part 121-style 
strategies presented here are categorized into these three areas. However, the recommendations offered here do not 
consider any related socio-political issues since they are outside the scope of this study.  
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Technology 
According to the FAA, equipping GA aircraft with new technologies can significantly reduce accidents 
(GAO, 2012). ADS-B is leading the list of promising technologies to be incorporated into the NAS. The ADS-B 
system consists of two fundamental services: ADS-B Out and ADS-B In (FAA, 2011a). The former broadcasts 
aircraft identification, real-time position, and velocity to controllers and other aircraft, while the latter is designed to 
accept ADS-B transmissions so pilots and controllers can utilize the information broadcasted by ADS-B out (FAA, 
2011a). Accelerating the adoption of ADS-B in GA can enhance safety as seen from previous large-scale tests in 
Alaska. The enormous success of ADS-B in Alaska (nearly 50% decrease in accident rates) underscores the 
importance of equipping the nationwide GA fleet with ADS-B avionics (McHale, 2010). Furthermore, data 
generated by a nationwide fleet of ADS-B out enabled aircraft enables NAS stakeholders to make data-driven 
decisions on the operation, safety, and progress of GA.  
The FAA already mandates ADS-B out equipage on a majority of GA aircraft by 2020 as part of the 
NextGen initiative, but there are also advantages to mandating ADS-B in equipage as well (FAA, 2011a). By 
requiring majority of aircraft to have ADS-B In, a larger portion of the GA population can take advantage of the 
wealth of up-to-date information that the already mandated ADS-B out offers. Since large commercial jetliners are 
slated to be ADS-B in equipped already, this will bring a majority of the NAS fleet to a unified standard. While 
mandating ADS-B in for GA aircraft is a regulatory action, it is an extension of an existing mandate that provides 
valuable benefits to pilots. Furthermore, while ADS-B in/out provides the information to GA pilots, supplemental 
training should be provided so that they can leverage it for increased situational awareness. 
Training and Education 
The majority of general aviation accidents are caused by pilot error, one of which is caused in part by a lack 
of quality recurrent training (GAO, 2012). Recurrent training is important in order to stay proficient, shorten the 
decision making time during normal or emergency situations, and increase safety; however, recurrent training is not 
always cost effective or an optimal use of time (Mayhew, n.d.). A flight simulator or flight training device (FTD) is 
an inexpensive and effective way for GA pilots to remain proficient (Mayhew, n.d.). The use of flight simulators as 
a recurrent training tool has proven very effective in the airline industry, as well as in the military, and is 
incorporated into their flight training standards (Willinger, 2012). Compared to training in an actual aircraft, 
simulators allow pilots to train on and explore risky maneuvers or unexpected situations that may be dangerous to 
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perform in an actual aircraft (Willinger, 2012). Additionally, simulators are cost effective and provide an economic 
advantage over training in an actual aircraft, since operating costs (fuel, maintenance, insurance, etc.) in actual 
aircraft are higher than those of a simulated aircraft. Although airlines have more advanced simulators equipped 
with 180-degree visual systems and motion platforms, a generic or aircraft-specific flight simulator can help 
enhance safe flying and reduce GA accidents (Willinger, 2012). 
In addition to targeting pilot error, the FAA has initiated several efforts to address issues associated with 
pilot testing and training (GAO, 2012). Initiatives that encourage pilots to remain vigilant and proactive towards 
safety issues, like the Wings program, are invaluable toward the FAA’s effort. However, they can be detrimental 
when safety itself is sacrificed for the sake of the program. Currently, GA pilots can be exempt from a bi-annual 
flight review upon successful completion of the Wings program (GAO, 2012). While incentivizing attendance is a 
good idea, the incentives should not be loopholes to avoid safety audits. Specifically for the Wings example, bi-
annual flight reviews should be mandatory regardless of what safety programs the pilot has attended. In place of the 
exemption, other valuable incentives, like prepaid fuel cards, can be offered instead. Generally speaking, incentives 
that exempt pilots and aircraft from important safety audits should be reviewed. Furthermore, additional valuable 
incentives (outside of exemptions) should be used to encourage pilot attendance at safety seminars and meetings. 
Situational Awareness 
Human error is inevitable, but taking a proactive measure through a system of checks and balances can 
reduce them. When pilots first learn to fly, their training is structured around a similar system to ensure they have 
the necessary knowledge to cope with different settings (Landsberg, n.d.). However, this system of checks and 
balances ends at completion of training unless the pilot chooses otherwise and requests further paid supervision 
(Landsberg, n.d.). In commercial aviation, a system of checks and balances exists notably in the form of a co-pilot 
and dispatcher. The system is employed during every operation to ensure that all flights are operated safely and that 
no single person has complete autonomy in the flight (Avjobs, n.d.). The idea of creating a similar system of checks 
and balances for GA operations is a promising opportunity to improve safety. 
Statistics compiled by Robert E. Breiling Associates, an accident analysis firm, confirmed that “a single-
pilot operation creates a higher workload and greater demand on the pilot skill…and that two heads are better than 
one.” (Landsberg, n.d., p.1) For example, creating a “co-pilot social network service” can be a proactive measure to 
enhance safety. This network service offers the pilot the opportunity to invite another pilots who are interested in 
REDUCING GENERAL AVIATION ACCIDENTS    15
collaborating (or “partnering up”) when flying, creating a two-man cockpit with similar checks and balances as 
those in commercial operations. Another way of creating a system of checks and balances is through a paid dispatch 
service. Similarly to the airline ops, the dispatcher is very familiar with navigation facilities, weather, and 
operational limits of an aircraft (Avjobs, n.d.). They maintain situational awareness of each flight and serve as an 
enroute advisor or safety officer to the pilot flying (Avjobs, n.d.).  
Conclusion and Recommendations 
It is difficult to believe that improvements in U.S. GA safety have stagnated, according to an analysis by the 
European Aviation Safety Agency (Commission and EASA , 2012). However, NTSB data shown in Figure 1 
corroborates that observation. Steadily high accident rates in GA compared to commercial aviation underscore a 
need to improve GA safety. The goal of this study was not for GA to reach an equivalent level of safety as that of 
commercial aviation, but to present ideas to improve safety. Specifically, the focus is to see where GA can learn 
from Part 121 operations in order to identify appropriate measures to prevent repetitive errors and increase GA 
safety. The ongoing efforts from the FAA and other aviation stakeholders should not only continue but also suggest 
further areas of improvement. In general, flight plan quality and flexibility, available resources, and governmental 
regulations are the primary differences between GA and commercial operations. The work done here recommends 
that stakeholders in the GA community:  
 Embrace in-cockpit technology to not only enable safer operations in ever-more crowded skies, but also 
permit reliable data collection on GA trends for data-driven decision making. 
 Offer valuable incentives for pilots to undergo quality recurrent and safety training, while also eliminating 
loopholes or incentives that compromise safety. 
 Institute a system of checks and balances to ensure that pilots have a sufficient safety net from human error. 
The above three recommendations are broadly defined and examples have been suggested. The road to improving 
GA safety is a long one filled with logistic, bureaucratic, and political obstacles. The data explored in this study 
could lead to ideas and inspiration that would build on the foundation for a safer future in general aviation. 
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Appendix A 
Table 6.  Accidents, Fatalities, and Rates, 1992 through 2011,          
for U.S. Air Carriers Operating Under 14 CFR 121, Scheduled Service (Airlines)         










Flown   




 Year    All   Fatal   Total   Aboard   Flight Hours   Miles Flown   Departures   All   Fatal   All   Fatal   All   Fatal  
1985  17 4 197 196 8,265,332 3,452,753,000 6,068,893 0.206 0.048 0.0049 0.0012 0.28 0.066 
1986 * 21 2 5 4 9,495,158 3,829,129,000 6,928,103 0.211 0.011 0.0052 0.0003 0.289 0.014 
1987 * 32 4 231 229 10,115,407 4,125,874,000 7,293,025 0.306 0.03 0.0075 0.0007 0.425 0.041 
1988 * 27 3 285 274 10,521,052 4,260,785,000 7,347,575 0.247 0.019 0.0061 0.0005 0.354 0.027 
1989  20 5 124 123 10,597,922 4,337,234,000 7,267,341 0.189 0.047 0.0046 0.0012 0.275 0.069 
1990  19 4 11 9 11,524,726 4,689,287,000 7,795,761 0.165 0.035 0.0041 0.0009 0.244 0.051 
1991  21 3 60 47 11,139,166 4,558,537,000 7,503,873 0.189 0.027 0.0046 0.0007 0.28 0.04 
1992  15 3 29 27 11,732,026 4,767,344,000 7,515,373 0.128 0.026 0.0031 0.0006 0.2 0.04 
1993  22 1 1 0 11,981,347 4,936,067,000 7,721,870 0.184 0.008 0.0045 0.0002 0.285 0.013 
1994 * 18 4 239 237 12,292,356 5,112,633,000 7,824,802 0.138 0.033 0.0033 0.0008 0.217 0.051 
1995  30 1 160 160 12,776,679 5,328,969,000 8,105,570 0.235 0.008 0.0056 0.0002 0.37 0.012 
1996  31 3 342 342 12,971,676 5,449,997,000 7,851,298 0.239 0.023 0.0057 0.0006 0.395 0.038 
1997  43 3 3 2 15,061,662 6,339,432,000 9,925,058 0.285 0.02 0.0068 0.0005 0.433 0.03 
1998  41 1 1 0 15,921,447 6,343,690,000 10,535,196 0.258 0.006 0.0065 0.0002 0.389 0.009 
1999  40 2 12 11 16,693,365 6,689,327,000 10,860,692 0.24 0.012 0.006 0.0003 0.368 0.018 
2000  49 2 89 89 17,478,519 7,152,260,000 11,053,826 0.28 0.011 0.0069 0.0003 0.443 0.018 
2001 * 41 6 531 525 17,157,858 6,994,939,000 10,632,880 0.216 0.012 0.0053 0.0003 0.348 0.019 
2002  34 0 0 0 16,718,781 6,927,954,000 10,276,107 0.203  -    0.0049  -    0.331  -    
2003  51 2 22 21 16,887,756 7,015,935,000 10,227,924 0.302 0.012 0.0073 0.0003 0.499 0.02 
2004  23 1 13 13 18,184,016 7,604,248,000 10,782,989 0.126 0.005 0.003 0.0001 0.213 0.009 
2005 32 34 3 22 20 18,712,191 7,843,717,000 10,910,460 0.182 0.016 0.0043 0.0004 0.312 0.027 
2006 32 26 2 50 49 18,647,896 7,851,864,000 10,627,481 0.139 0.011 0.0033 0.0003 0.245 0.019 
2007 32 26 0 0 0 19,014,677 8,024,313,000 10,734,170 0.137  -    0.0032  -    0.242  -    
2008 32 20 0 0 0 18,551,362 7,813,371,000 10,271,446 0.108  -    0.0026  -    0.195  -    
2009 32 26 1 50 49 17,160,572 7,248,702,000 9,542,493 0.152 0.006 0.0036 0.0001 0.272 0.01 
2010 32 27 0 0 0 17,222,996 7,352,374,000 9,462,310 0.157  -    0.0037  -    0.285  -    
2011 32 28 0 0 0 17,285,000 7,456,000,000 8,910,000 0.162  -    0.0038  -    0.314  -    
  Notes Flight hours, miles, and departures are compiled by the Federal Aviation Administration.       
   Since March 20, 1997, aircraft with 10 or more seats used in scheduled passenger service have been operated under 14 CFR 121.    
   Years followed by the symbol * are those in which an illegal act was responsible for an occurrence in this category.  These acts, such as    
        suicide and sabotage are included in the totals for accidents and fatalities but are excluded for the purpose of accident rate computation.   
        Table 12 contains a list of illegal act occurrences involving US air carriers for the period covered by this table.  Other than the persons aboard    
        aircraft who were killed, fatalities resulting from the September 11, 2001 terrorist acts are excluded from this table.     
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Appendix B 
Table 10.  Accidents, Fatalities, and Rates, 1992 through 2011, U.S. General Aviation    
  Accidents    Fatalities    
 Accidents  
per 100,000  
Flight Hours   
Year All Fatal Total Aboard  Flight Hours   All   Fatal  
1976 4018 658 1216 1203 30,476,000 13.17 2.16 
1977 4079 661 1276 1265 31,578,000 12.91 2.09 
1978 4216 719 1556 1398 34,887,000 12.08 2.06 
1979 3818 631 1221 1203 38,641,000 9.88 1.63 
1980 3590 618 1239 1230 36,402,000 9.86 1.69 
1981 3500 654 1282 1261 36,803,000 9.51 1.78 
1982 3,233 591 1187 1171 29,640,000 10.82 1.96 
1983 3,075 555 1,068 1,061 28,673,000 10.67 1.92 
1984 3,017 545 1,042 1,021 29,099,000 10.28 1.84 
1985 2,739 498 956 945 28,322,000 9.63 1.74 
1986 2,581 474 967 879 27,073,000 9.49 1.73 
1987 2,494 446 837 822 26,972,000 9.18 1.63 
1988 2,388 460 797 792 27,446,000 8.65 1.66 
1989 2,242 432 769 766 27,920,000 7.97 1.52 
1990 2,242 444 770 765 28,510,000 7.85 1.55 
1991 2,197 439 800 786 27,678,000 7.91 1.57 
1992 2,110 450 866 864 24,780,000 8.51 1.81 
1993 2,064 401 744 740 22,796,000 9.03 1.74 
1994 2,021 404 730 723 22,235,000 9.08 1.81 
1995 2,055 412 734 727 24,906,000 8.21 1.63 
1996 1,908 361 636 619 24,881,000 7.65 1.45 
1997 1,840 350 631 625 25,591,000 7.17 1.36 
1998 1,902 364 624 618 25,518,000 7.43 1.41 
1999 1,905 340 621 615 29,246,000 6.5 1.16 
2000 1,837 345 596 585 27,838,000 6.57 1.21 
2001 1,727 325 562 558 25,431,000 6.78 1.27 
2002 1,715 345 581 575 25,545,000 6.69 1.33 
2003 1,741 352 633 630 25,998,000 6.68 1.34 
2004 1,617 314 559 559 24,888,000 6.49 1.26 
2005 1,671 321 563 558 23,168,000 7.2 1.38 
2006 1,523 308 706 547 23,963,000 6.35 1.28 
2007 1,653 288 496 491 23,819,000 6.93 1.2 
2008 1,569 276 495 486 22,805,000 6.87 1.21 
2009 1,480 275 479 470 20,862,000 7.08 1.32 
2010 1,439 268 454 451 21,688,000 6.63 1.23 
2011 1,466 263 444 433 22,514,000 6.51 1.17 
 Notes Flight hours are estimated by the Federal Aviation Administration.  Miles flown and departure  
       information for general aviation operations is not available.   
  
Suicide, sabotage and stolen/unauthorized aircraft cases, included in "Accidents" and 
"Fatalities"  
       but excluded from accident rates in this table are: 1992 (2 acc., 1 fatal acc.);   
      1993 (5, 4); 1994 (3, 2); 1995 (10, 6); 1996 (4, 0); 1997 (5, 2); 1998 (6, 4); 1999 (3, 1);  
      2000 (7, 7); 2001 (3, 1); 2002 (7, 6); 2003 (4, 3); 2004 (3, 0); 2005 (2, 1); 2006 (2, 1);  
      2007 (2, 2); 2008 (2, 0); 2009 (3, 0); 2010 (2, 1); 2011 (0, 0)   
        
  The 706 total fatalities in 2006 includes the 154 persons killed aboard a foreign registered  
       Boeing 737 aircraft operated by Gol Airlines when it collided with an Embraer Legacy 600  
       business jet over the Brazilian Amazon jungle.     
        
  49 CFR Part 830.1 pertains to accidents that involve civil aircraft and certain public aircraft of the   
       United States Òwherever they occur.Ó  For the year 2011, the total number of accidents includes  
  
     19 U.S. registered (N-numbered) aircraft accidents that occurred outside the United States, 
its territories, or its possessions.  
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Appendix C 
These two accident case studies were highlighted in the Nall Report (2010) and furthered researched through NTSB 
reports.  
 
Accident Case Study #CEN09FA230 (Air Safety Institute, 2010; NTSB, 2010a) 
Cessna 337C departed a private strip during night conditions. Shortly after takeoff, witnesses on the ground 
described the engines as running rough and eventually quit, causing the aircraft to crash. The pilot, having a 
total of 23,260 hours of total flight time, died in the crash. Examining the sequence of events, NTSB 
determined that the aircraft ran out of fuel in flight due to the pilot’s inadequate fuel planning. 
 
Accident Case Study #CEN09FA393 (Air Safety Institute, 2010; NTSB, 2010b) 
Piper PA32R-300 attempted to takeoff on a grass airstrip during the day in VFR conditions. An employee 
who helped load the plane stated the plane seemed overloaded and noticed that the crew was “in a hurry to 
leave.” The NTSB investigation revealed that the pilot took off without flaps and 188 pounds overweight. 
The subsequent report concluded that the probable cause of the crash was “the pilot’s poor 
judgment/decision making.” 
 
